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MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. By Her-
bert Fingarette and Ann Fingarette Hasse. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 1979. Pp. xi, 332. $19.50. 
Criminal defenses based on mental disability may take many 
forms, ranging from complete defenses such as insanity and involun-
tariness to partial defenses such as intoxication and diminished ca-
pacity. In rationale and consequences these defenses may vary 
widely, but the basis for each, according to Fingarette and Hasse, 1 is 
the commonly held intuition that an irrational state of mind negates 
criminal responsibility (p. 6). Armed with this insight, the authors 
attempt to unravel the doctrinal "thicket" (p. 3) that these defenses 
comprise. They begin by demonstrating how the courts have inter-
twined the defense of mental disability with other criminal law con-
cepts. After disentangling these concepts, the authors present a 
comprehensive synthesis of the mental disability defenses, a synthe-
sis that purportedly encompasses all possible theories on which to 
mitigate or eliminate criminal responsjbility because of irrationality. 
The bulk of the book contains a~ exegesis of the multitude of 
present and proposed mental disability defenses. This analysis both 
illuminates the particular defenses discussed and underscores the au-
thors' thesis that irrationality is at the core of each. For example, the 
authors argue that courts often confuse the concepts of "mistake of 
fact," "mistake of law," and "involuntariness" with the insanity de-
fense. "Mistake" implies that a person having the capacity to act 
rationally has erred in exercising that capacity. By contrast, the in-
sane defendant is one who lacks the capacity to know the law or the 
facts (pp. 25, 28-39). And while involuntary acts are those done 
without choice or will, criminal actions resulting from mental disease 
are often purposeful, intentional, and ingeniously planned (pp. 52-
53). Therefore, full or partial mitigation must be based on the de-
fendant's irrational state of mind and not on involuntariness or mis-
take. 
Part III of the book examines the partial mental disability de-
fenses of alcohol and drug intoxication and diminished capacity. 
Under the common law, these defenses negated the specific intent to 
do the criminal act, but not the general intent to do a lesser included 
offense. Fingarette and Hasse argue that this distinction between 
I. Herbert Fingarette is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Santa 
Barbara. Ann Fingarette Hasse works for a San Francisco law firm. 
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specific and general intent is indefensible (pp. 95-96) and irrelevant, 
because it is irrationality, and not the absence of specific intent, that 
justifies reducing the defendant's criminal liability (p. 99). Since in-
toxication foreseeably increases the risk of committing a crime, the 
defendant is culpable for becoming intoxicated. Consequently, the 
defendant should still be punished, though not as severely as a sober 
defendant (pp. 100-02). 
Having disentangled the mental disability or irrationality defense 
from other criminal law concepts and defenses, Fingarette and Hasse 
present in Part V their version of the mental disability defense, 
called the Disability of Mind (D.O.M.) Doctrine. This doctrine, 
claim the authors, will end the search for such will-6-the-wisps as 
"mental disease" or "specific intent" and will focus attention where 
it belongs: on the defendant's capacity for rational thought and his 
culpability, if any, for impairing that capacity. Three sequential jury 
questions suffice to apply the doctrine in any given case, with the 
jury proceeding to the next question only if it answers "yes" to the 
one before it. The first question is: Did the defendant commit the 
criminal act? The jury must determine if the accused did the act and 
if he has any defenses other than D.O.M. If the defendant commit-
ted the act and has no other valid exculpatory claims, the jury enters 
a guilty verdict (p. 209) and moves to the second question: Did the 
accused, at the time of the act, suffer from total or partial D.O.M. (p. 
200)? If the answer is affirmative, the jury indicates the extent of 
D.O.M. (partial or total), and moves to the third question: Did the 
accused culpably induce his disability (p. 20 I)? 
The effect of a finding of D.O.M. would be felt in sentencing, 
rather than in the verdict. The following example illustrates this 
process. Consider the madman who, after sufficient reflection, stran-
gles his wife thinking that he is squeezing a lemon (p. 24). The jury 
would find the man guilty of murder. Next, it would find total 
D.O.M. since the accused was utterly incapable of understanding the 
criminal significance of his conduct. If the insanity resulted from 
causes beyond the defendant's control, the jury would find 
nonculpable D.O.M. The judge then would impose no sentence on 
the defendant because nonculpable, total D.O.M. is a complete de-
fense. If the defendant caused his insanity (e.g., through addiction 
to, or overuse of, drugs or alcohol) the jury would find culpable 
D.O.M. The judge would then impose a lighter sentence (preferably 
with statutory guidance) than that imposed on other defendants, for 
although the defendant's mind was disabled at the time of the of-
fense, the defendant is responsible for the disability. Finally, if the 
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defendant is still disabled at the time of sentencing, the Court would 
require him to undergo psychiatric and medical care, both for his 
own good and for the protection of society (p. 202). 
The D.O.M. doctrine has been severely criticized.2 But regard-
less of its ultimate success, the doctrine is a significant attempt to 
synthesize the various concepts traditionally used in mental disabil-
ity defenses into one coherent system that emphasizes irrationality as 
the justification for exculpation or mitigation. In attempting this 
synthesis, the authors clarify what intuitions and concepts underlie 
the mental disability defenses. For these achievements, the authors 
are to be commended.3 
2. See Arenella, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 420, 424 n.10, 432-33 (1980). 
3. Other reviews of this book include Arenella, supra note 2; Lamborn, Book Review, 66 
A.B.A. J. 614 (1980). 
